SAKSHAM VASHISHTHA
DOI: https://doi.org/This research paper critically examines the dynamic and often contentious relationship between the political executive and the permanent administrative apparatus within the framework of Indian governance. Utilizing a historical-institutional approach, it analyzes how India's constitutional design, rooted in a quasi-federal structure and the Westminster model, shapes the boundaries of administrative function and political authority. The core finding is that the efficiency and accountability of India's administrative state, while resilient and professional (exemplified by the All India Services), are perpetually mediated by the intense, identity-driven nature of Indian electoral politics, leading to persistent challenges such as political interference, corruption, and the erosion of administrative neutrality. Conversely, the paper details how targeted administrative reforms, particularly the constitutional mandate for decentralization and the widespread adoption of e-Governance (e.g., the Digital India initiative and DBT), represent a paradigm shift towards greater transparency and citizen-centric service delivery, acting as essential correctives to the pressures exerted by the political system. Ultimately, the paper concludes that sustained, ethical political commitment to bureaucratic autonomy is indispensable for realizing the full potential of India's administrative capacity and achieving inclusive developmental goals in the world's largest democracy.
